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"TO CORRAL AND CONTROL THE GHETTO": STOP,
FRISK, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF FREEDOM
Anders Walker *
Behind police brutality there is social brutality, economic brutality, andpolitical brutality.
- Eldridge Cleaver'
INTRODUCTION

Few issues in American criminal justice have proven more toxic to police/community relations than stop and frisk. To take just
one example, federal judge Shira Scheindlin recently declared
that stops lacking "individualized reasonable suspicion" had become so "pervasive and persistent" in New York City that they
not only reflected "standard [police] procedure," but had become
"a fact of daily life" for minority residents.2 Scheindlin promptly
ordered "immediate changes to the NYPD's policies," meanwhile
recalling the Supreme Court's observation in Terry v. Ohio that
"the degree of community resentment" caused by a particular police practice could influence judicial "assessment" of that practice.'
Scheindlin's invocation of Terry as a curb on stop and frisk
proved remarkable. According to most accounts, Terry marked a

* Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Ph.D, 2003, Yale University; J.D.,
1998, Duke University; B.A., 1994, Wesleyan University. I would like to thank Tracey
Meares, David Sklansky, Jeffrey Fagan, Devon Carbado, Darryl K. Brown, Kami Chavis
Simmons, Scott Sundby, Arnold Loewy, Eric J. Miller, and Joel Goldstein for input on this
piece. I would also like to thank Adina Schwartz, Dorothy Schultz, and the members of the
John Jay College of Criminal Justice faculty for early conversations on this topic, including insight into the role that riots played in the development of a Humanities curriculum
for the New York City Police Department.
1. ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 125 (1992).
2. Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at *71
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013).
3. Id. at *2, *75 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1968)).
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turning point in the Supreme Court's criminal procedure revolution, a move away from extending constitutional rights to minorities and towards granting increased discretion to police, through
the sanctioning of stop and frisk.4 Yet, Scheindlin's point evokes a
different history, one that played out almost half a century ago on
the streets of New York. At that time, Terry did not betray the
Warren Court's revolution so much as compensate for tensions
exacerbated by it, particularly issues triggered by Mapp v. Ohio,
the landmark 1961 opinion extending the exclusionary rule to the
states.' Praised for requiring that police procure detailed warrants before entering private homes, Mapp actually worsened interactions between police and minorities on the street, in part by
encouraging police to develop creative means of stopping suspects, including techniques that involved intimidation and violence.' As news of such methods began to spread, the New York
Police Department ("NYPD") itself began to lobby for more formalized stop and frisk requirements, hoping to reduce the likelihood of police/minority conflict.! The Supreme Court's eventual
approval of such requirements in Terry v. Ohio and a companion
case styled Sibron v. New York, marked a standardization of po-

4. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 1 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that the Court's procedure rulings were partly "triggered by the Supreme Court's growing appreciation of the position
occupied by the 'underprivileged' of society-minority groups, the poor, and the young"); I.

Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality
Principle,46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing that an interest in equality animated the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution); Tracey L. Meares, Everything

Old Is New Again: FundamentalFairnessand the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 106 (2005) (describing the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases as
"a branch of 'race law"' that aimed to ameliorate racial inequality).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
6. See infra Part II. The argument made here is different from Darryl K. Brown's
claim that the Warren Court's criminal procedure rulings "prompted widespread opposition that took the form of political debate and reform efforts." Darryl K. Brown, The War-

ren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1411, 1416 (2002). While Brown is correct, this article posits that the Court's criminal procedure rulings also served to obscure urban inequalities, long before engendering a
conservative, legislative backlash. Also, the backlash that did ensue in New York aimed
not to undo the Warren Court's decisions so much as to limit the negative effect that Mapp

v. Ohio had on street altercations between urban minorities and police. For an argument
similar to Brown's, see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that the
Court's procedure rulings were partly "triggered by the Supreme Court's growing appreciation of the position occupied by the 'underprivileged' of society-minority groups, the
poor, and the young"); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and

Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2010); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between CriminalProcedure and CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 50-51, 53 (1997).
7. See infra Part III.
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lice procedure that appeared to facilitate local policing, even as it
bore larger, geographic implications.! No longer free to enter
homes without warrants, police in New York intensified their focus on public spaces, pushing liberty indoors and setting the
stage for the increased surveillance of the public sphere, a move
that facilitated the apprehension and incarceration of black men.'
While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that
stop and frisks often serve as the gateway into the criminal justice system for young men of color, she occludes the complex forces that led to their rise."o This article seeks to identify those forces, relating the rise of stop and frisk rules to liberal politics, Cold
War concerns, and spatial dynamics. To illustrate, this article
will proceed in three parts. Part I will demonstrate how Mapp v.
Ohio coincided with judicial frustration at police intrusions into
private, intimate space-including private thought-precisely at
a time when the United States sought to distinguish itself from
totalitarian "thought control" regimes during the Cold War. Part
II will show how the Court's effort to prevent thought control and
guard intimate space in Mapp engendered an unanticipated public effect, leading police both to lie about arrests and to use more
violent means for procuring evidence from suspects on the
street." Finally, Part III will show how such street-level tensions
played out at the local and national levels, interiorizing liberty in
ways that allowed for a narrative of expanding freedoms amidst a
climate of increased police control."
Though scholars tend to cite 1968 as a turning point in the
Warren Court's jurisprudence, a moment when liberal impulses
on the Court succumbed to a conservative "counter-revolution,"

8. The argument that the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions were ultimately a theatrical move to reduce police/minority tensions does not contradict Devon
Carbado's claim that police/minority interactions constitute "racial theater." See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 953 (2002). On
the contrary, this piece argues that the Warren Court became very interested in improving
the theatrical quality of such interactions, partly to reduce the likelihood that bystanders
would react negatively to police searches and arrests.
9.

See MICHELLE ALEXANDER,

THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE

OF COLORBLINDNESS 132-33 (2010).
10. Id. at 136.

11. Sarah Barlow, Patternsof Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 556-57, 559-60 (1968).
12. While Michelle Alexander focuses heavily on conservative backlash politics, this
article places responsibility at the feet of liberal reformers as well. See, e.g., ALEXANDER,
supra note 9, at 134-36.
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this article suggests a more fractured narrative-one in which
liberal and conservative justices alike tolerated expansions of
domestic liberty but moved increasingly, inadvertently, to heightening regulations of urban landscapes." Here, concerns over state
infringement on personal privacy in the 1950s help explain the
Court's interest in expanding liberty in private, intimate settings,
meanwhile moving quickly to contain direct action protest and violence in public spaces. 4 Over time, the Warren Court's criminal
procedure revolution assumed a geographic dimension, pushing
liberty into discrete spaces that posed little threat of violent
crime, political disorder, or riots."

13. See PRISCILLA H. MACHADO ZorrI, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: MAPP V. OHIO AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 170 (2005); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 407-11 (2000); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 192 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that appointees in the early
1970s began to move the Court away from the aggressive defense of individual rights);
Carbado, supra note 8, at 970-71 (highlighting how the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates a willful blindness to uncontestable facts about race and

policing); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protectionof Minorities,
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1289, 1315 (1982); Dan M. Kahan & Tracy L. Meares, Forward: The
Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156-59 (1998) (noting the
Court's failure to be more forthcoming about the racial dimension of criminal procedure

cases); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and CriminalJustice: A Quarter-CenturyRetrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 2-3 (1995) (suggesting that, in its final years, the Warren Court
was not the same Court that decided Mapp v. Ohio or Miranda v. Arizona); A. Kenneth
Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure,67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1968); Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
603, 605 (2007); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1288 (1999). For a related reading of the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution, see Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court'sRegulatory Revolution in
Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2010) (arguing that the Warren Court did
not extend rights to criminal defendants so much as insist on "inter-branch" regulation of
police/defendant interaction). See also Fabio Arcila, Jr., Suspicion and the Protection of
Fourth Amendment Values, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 237, 240 (2010) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment values include not simply aiding minorities but "limiting governmental discretion, protecting privacy and dignitary interests, minimizing intrusiveness, and assuring
a compelling and legitimate governmental need for a search). To Miller, the Court pursued
a "republican" approach to criminal justice regulation. Miller, supra, at 16. This article
posits a more ad hoc approach: first an expansion of liberty in intimate spaces and then a
move towards containing blacks in urban ghettos.
14. ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR
ERA 133-34 (1988).
15. The argument in this piece tracks criminal law scholar Bernard Harcourt's effort
to "expose the real stakes" in the debate over police searches, arguing that improved police
procedure plays a critical role in the maintenance of structural inequality. Bernard E.

Harcourt, UnconstitutionalPolice Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL'Y 363, 365 (2004).
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That the Court interiorized liberty in the 1960s is a point only
hinted at by scholars." For example, criminal procedure scholars
David Sklansky and Jeannie Suk have both raised the intimacy
dimensions of Supreme Court Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence. 7 To Sklansky, the Court's concern with the Fourth
Amendment stemmed in part from an interest in thwarting police
harassment of gay men." For Suk, the Court's interest in the
Fourth Amendment coincided with a larger interest in protecting
intimate space, particularly the home-a place where "woman,"
as the Court put it in 1961, "is still regarded as the center of
home and family life."" Both scholars characterize the Court's
concern for regulating police in terms that evoke intimate relationships, either between same sex couples or couples of the opposite sex; pairs that bear little in common with isolated individuals
on the street.
Building on Suk and Sklansky, this article posits that the
Court's interest in curtailing police stemmed less from an interest
in ameliorating substantive inequality than from expanding the
scope of freedom in politically neutral, private spaces. Though
remembered as a bid to help the poor, many of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure decisions actually did little to help the
less affluent.0 Black activists in New York argued precisely this
point in the 1960s, questioning the Court's concern for the poor
and agreeing with police that law enforcement's function vis-a-vis
minorities had shifted from "[c]rime prevention" to "peacekeeping," a role aimed primarily at controlling urban landscapes.2 According to black writer James Baldwin, the Court's

16. See David Alan Sklansky, "One Train May Hide Another": Katz, Stonewall, and
the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 877-78 (2008); Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 492-93 (2009).
17. See Sklansky, supra note 16, at 877-78; Suk, supra note 16, at 492-93.
18. Sklansky suggests that the Court's interest in restricting state eavesdropping on
phone lines stemmed from a spatial concern over state surveillance of intimate relations
between gay men in toilet stalls. See Sklansky, supra note 16, at 879.
19. Suk, supra note 16, at 509 (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)). Suk
shows how feminists challenged gendered tropes of privacy in the late twentieth century
in JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS

TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 124-28 (2009) [hereinafter AT HOME IN THE LAW].
20. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that the Court's procedure rulings were partly "triggered by the Supreme Court's growing appreciation of the
position occupied by the 'underprivileged' of society-minority groups, the poor, and the
young").
21. In June 1969, CUNY Sociology professor and former NYPD officer Arthur Niederhoffer posited that police had suddenly taken on two very different roles-"[c]rime preven-
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campaign to soften police procedure sought primarily to contain
black urban populations, or as he put it, "to corral and control the
ghetto."2 2 In fact, from 1961 to 1968, New York City police and
radical black leaders alike complained that the city was heightening the risk of urban violence by focusing on procedural/privacy
matters, meanwhile ignoring structural causes of poverty and inequality.22 Rather than level the playing field between rich and
poor, the Warren Court's procedure rulings struck black activists
and New York City cops alike as a type of theatre aimed at preserving inequality by holstering the truncheon and improving the
management of the poor rather than by fixing underlying socioeconomic problems plaguing urban communities."
That criminal procedure served a theatrical function in the
1960s coincides with the argument made by criminologist Peter
K. Manning that much of modern policing hinges on image management, on maintaining "public support" for police by curtailing
violence and engaging in a larger "drama of control."25 According
to Manning, this drama became particularly important in the
United States as "the rise of large minority populations in urban
areas and their exclusion from many opportunities changed the
problems of urban social integration and crime into the more serious issue of politically managing a rising underclass demanding
wider access to all forms of community service."" Though Manning focuses his inquiry on the rise of community policing in the
1980s, his analysis can be extended further to the 1960s and extended to include the federal judiciary.27 During that time, this

tion" and "peace-keeping"-both of which were "antithetical." David Burnham, The Changing City: Crime on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1969, at 35 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
22. James Baldwin, James Baldwin on the Harlem Riots, N.Y. POST, August 2, 1964,
at 3.
23. For works documenting police/Panther violence, see PAUL ALKEBULAN, SURVIVAL
PENDING REVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (2007); CURTIS J.
AUSTIN, UP AGAINST THE WALL: VIOLENCE IN THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE BLACK
PANTHER PARTY 89-112 (2006); WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, NEW DAY IN BABYLON: THE
BLACK POWER MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE 1965-75, at 157-60 (1992).
24. The use of theatre described in this piece aimed to obscure larger inequalities in
American society, not to act as "a morality play for those involved in the nitty gritty of law
enforcement," as Scott E. Sundby argues in Mapp v. Ohio's Unsung Hero: The Suppression
Hearingas Morality Play, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 255, 257 (2010).

25. Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control, in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 28 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1991).

26. Id. at 27.
27.

Id.
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article posits, the drama of control became crucial not only to local police but also to the Supreme Court, which as we shall see,
moved aggressively to improve the image of urban police even as
it constrained the protest powers of urban minorities, all of which
was part of a larger move to facilitate "managing a rising underclass."28
I. THOUGHT CONTROL

Though oft-considered an opening salvo in the Warren Court's
criminal procedure revolution, Mapp v. Ohio began its constitutional journey as a dispute over dirty books." Suspected of harboring a person involved in a local bombing, Dollree Mapp confronted police at her Cleveland home on May 23, 1957, seized a
document that they proclaimed to be a warrant, and stuffed it in
her shirt." After a tussle, police recovered the paper and proceeded to search Mapp's house, ultimately discovering four books:
London Stage Affairs, Affairs of a Troubador,Memoirs of a Hotel
Man, and Little Darlings, together with "a nude pencil sketch,
and several photos found in a suitcase."" Convinced that the
items were obscene, police arrested her for "possession of obscene
pictures and books."3 2
Though Mapp's attorneys fought to exclude the evidence at trial, they abandoned that position on appeal, arguing instead that
Ohio's obscenity statute was unconstitutionally vague and that
Mapp's arrest was so outrageous as to warrant an acquittal.3 The
latter argument followed Rochin v. California, a 1952 Supreme
Court case chastising police for ordering a defendant's stomach
pumped to retrieve heroine, something the Court found so egregious that it not only "shock[ed] the conscience," but violated the

28. Id. Bernard Harcourt has identified a similar irony in the imposition of curfew
laws in urban parks, noting how the enforcement of such laws curtail political demonstrations but do little to silence corporate speech in the form of public advertisements. See

Bernard Harcourt, The Occupy Chicago Arrests: Rahm Emanuel's 'Dry Run' for G8 and
Nato?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifame
rica/2012/feb/16/occupy-chicago-arrests-rahm-emanuels-dry-run.
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961).
30. Id. at 644.
31. CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
& SEIZURES 8-9 (2006).
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id. at 25.
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Constitution.4 Just as unconstitutional, argued Mapp's legal
counsel, was Ohio's obscenity law, a relatively recent measure
that expanded criminal liability from manufacturers and sellers
of pornography to private citizens." On this point, Mapp received
support from the Ohio Civil Liberties Union ("OCLU"), which argued that the law was not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, failed to adequately define obscenity, and invaded the
"private rights" of individuals." Such rights, argued the OCLU,
stemmed from the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendmentsa type of emanation argument that prefigured Griswold v. Connecticut." Also, the OCLU's First Amendment attack drew
strength from a 1959 Supreme Court case, Smith v. California,
holding that even though obscenity did not warrant constitutional
protection, a state law prohibiting merchants from mere possession of obscene books violated the First Amendment.
Though the First Amendment question failed to persuade a
requisite majority of Ohio's Supreme Court, it did capture the attention of the nation's highest tribunal." In conferences and private discussions on the case, Justice Harlan argued persuasively
that the core issue of the case was "thought control."o Others concurred. In fact, the day after oral arguments in the case, all of the
Justices "agreed" that the core concern in Mapp was the manner
in which Ohio's obscenity law amounted to a "thought control
statute .41

The Court's identification of Ohio's obscenity law as a thought
control statute is worth noting. The term first emerged in the
1920s when word broke that the Japanese government was considering new statutory means of regulating dissent." Such stories
became even more prevalent during World War II, when both Japan and Nazi Germany imposed strict regulations on public
thought and speech." Following the war, many in the West sus34.
35.

342 U.S. 165, 166, 172 (1952).
LONG, supra note 31, at 24-25, 29-30.

36. Id. at 27.
37.
38.
39.

381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); LONG, supra note 31, at 27.
361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
LONG, supra note 31, at 63.

40. Id. at 82-83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41.
42.

Id. at 82.
RICHARD H. MITCHELL, THOUGHT CONTROL IN PREWAR JAPAN 19-38 (1976).

43. Hugh Byas, Japan's Censors Aspire to "Thought Control," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1937, (Magazine), at 4; Albion Ross, Goebbels Edits the Popular Mind in Germany, N.Y.
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pected the Soviet Union of imposing thought control on its people,
inspiring author George Orwell to pen an alarming critique of totalitarianism entitled 1984.44 Published in 1949, 1984 resonated
with concerns that the Soviet Union had established within its
borders a police state denying freedom of thought to its citizens.
Some Americans warned that such restraints were coming to
the United States. In 1949, Princeton University President Dodds
argued that were it not for the nation's sustained support of private institutions, particularly private schools, Americans might
succumb to "a growing threat of Government 'thought control."'"
Five years later, Florida attorney John M. Coe accused the federal government of just that, declaring that the Internal Security
Act "put the Government in the thought-control business by placing restraints on speech, press and assembly."
Enacted over a presidential veto in 1950, the Internal Security
Act, or McCarran Act, required that communists forgo employment in government, unions, and the defense industry, while registering with the Subversive Activities Control Board, a government agency formed to neutralize domestic communist threats.4 8
Though the Supreme Court declared the McCarran Act constitutional in 1951, it hardened its view in 1955 as Senator Joseph
McCarthy accused military officials of communist sympathies,
compromising the credibility of anti-communists nationally.49 In
1957, the Court overturned the convictions of fourteen defendants
who allegedly belonged to the Communist Party, several justices
complaining that their conviction represented "a political trial" in
violation of the First Amendment."

TIMES, Feb. 14, 1937, (Magazine), at 3.
44. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (providing a graphic depiction of the
dangers of absolute governmental power).

45. Id.; see Robert Harris, 60 Years After Orwell Wrote 1984 and Was Destroyed by the
Book, a Chilling Reminder That His Sinister Is Almost Reality, DAILY MAIL (June 12,
2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1192484/60-years-Orwell-wrote-1984-dest
royed-book-chining-reminder-sinister-vision-reality.html.

46. Murray Illson, Dodds Finds Peril to Free Education: PrincetonHead Warns of U.S.
'Thought-Control'inTalk at Washington & Lee Event, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1949, at 30.
47. Suit Begun to Kill New Security Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1950, at 6 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
48. POWE, supra note 13, at 77, 98-99.
49. Id. at 80.
50. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 280, 282 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE].
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The Supreme Court referred repeatedly to thought control in
the 1950s, always as a distinguishing characteristic of totalitarian regimes.5' In 1950, for example, the Court made a point of refuting a charge of thought control against section 9(h) of the 1947
Labor Management Relations Act, requiring labor union officers
to file an affidavit stating that they were not communists." Similarly, in 1952, the Court rejected a charge that piping music into
public streetcars constituted "thought control," though Justice
Douglas warned of it in a dissent." "Once privacy is invaded," he
declared, "privacy is gone," insinuating that even though playing
government-sponsored music on streetcars might have been a
harmless cultural program, "[iut may be but a short step," he
prophesied, "from a cultural program to a political program." 4
Though a passing assertion in an arguably inconsequential dissent, Douglas's mention of "political program[s]" in Public Utilities v. Pollak revealed the manner in which he viewed "[t]he right
of privacy" to be a "powerful deterrent to any one who would control men's minds.""
Closely linked to the Court's interest in "men's minds" was a
concomitant interest in restrictions on what private citizens could
read. Evidence of this emerged not simply in thought control cases like Public Utilities v. Pollak and American Communicationsv.
Douds, but in obscenity cases like Butler v. Michigan, decided in
1957, where the Supreme Court struck down a Michigan statute
enjoining the publication or distribution of materials "manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth."" Though comfortable with the idea that states could control obscenity, the
Court rejected the idea that standards set for children should
govern adults. Four months later, the Court confronted the problem of obscenity again, this time in a case challenging the conviction of Samuel Roth, a bookseller convicted of publishing a maga-

51.

See, e.g., POWE, supra note 13, at 193, 314.

52.

Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 385-86, 408, 411-12 (1950) (distin-

guishing section 9(h) from the "straw man of 'thought control"').
53.

Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 460 n.6, 465-66 (1952).

54. Id. at 469 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In 1959, the Court overturned the suspension
of a Hawaii attorney who had declared that Smith Act trials were leading the country to
the "dark ages of thought control." In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 628 n.4 (1959) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
55. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 469 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381-83 (1957).
57. POWE, supranote 13, at 114-15.
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zine entitled American Aphrodite." Here, the Court cabined what
could be considered obscene, exempting works of literature and
art thought to have critical merit, and aimed at more than simply
"appealing to prurient interest.""
Ironically, even as the Court worked to liberalize restrictions
on erotic literature, so too did Cold War conservatives link the
cause of sexual liberation to national weakness and communism.60
"[S]exual excesses or degeneracy," notes historian Elaine Tyler
May, were considered by conservatives in the 1950s to make "individuals easy prey for communist tactics."" Consequently, the
FBI "mounted an all-out effort to discover the personal sexual
habits of those under suspicion of subversive behavior," with a
particular emphasis on "homosexuals."62 According to Nebraska
Senator Kenneth Wherry, it was impossible to "separate homosexuals from subversives," a sentiment that led to an "obsession"
with rooting out gays in government." Also targeted were heterosexual officials living outside the "maturity" and "responsibility"
of marriage, sparking a bizarrely Puritanical crusade to regulate
both sexual proclivities and private thought.6 4
Notions that sexual deviance threatened national security cut
against the Supreme Court's tendency towards liberalizing erotic
literature and freeing "men's minds," perhaps explaining why the
Court avoided striking down Ohio's obscenity law in Mapp, preferring instead the less salacious path of invoking the exclusionary rule against the states.65 Though Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker balked when Clark mentioned the exclusionary

58. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 50, at 353 n.158.
59. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1957).
60. DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS
AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 38 (2004).
61. MAY, supra note 14, at 94.
62. Id. at 95-96.
63.

STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, THE CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR 43 (1991).

64. MAY, supra note 14, at 94.
65. While this article posits that there may have been a sexual component to Mapp,
either frustration with federal efforts to link sexual deviance with communism or increasing federal intrusions into the private intimate lives of individuals suspected of being unAmerican, it is certainly also true that the Court had been looking for an opportunity to
extend the rule to the states, as Thomas Y. Davies argues in his review of Carolyn Long's
book MAPP V. Omo: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (2006).

See Thomas Y. Davies, An Account of Mapp v. Ohio That Misses the Larger Exclusionary
Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 628 (2007) (reviewing CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V.
OHIo: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (2006)).
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rule, an issue that Mapp's attorneys had not briefed, the impulse
to sidestep sex and overturn Wolf v. Colorado may simply have
been an effort to "hide" one train behind another, as privacy
scholar David Sklansky argues the Court did six years later in
Katz v. United States, again a case involving police and sex." Indeed, Sklansky's observation that the Court sought to hide protections for gay men subjected to police surveillance in the rhetoric of Fourth Amendment privacy may itself have stemmed from
judicial frustration with histrionic Cold War claims that homosexuals threatened national security.
Even if the Court was not responding to Cold War sexual paranoia, the majority opinion in Mapp nevertheless framed the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states in decidedly intimate terms. According to Justice Clark, the police in question did
not simply arrest Dollree Mapp for possessing pornographic literature, they "broke" into her home and proceeded to run "roughshod" over her. In terms evoking sexual assault and even rape,
Justice Clark recounted how one officer retrieved a sheet of paper
from Mapp's "bosom," "grabbed her," "twisted [her] hand," and
"forcibly" took her "upstairs to her bedroom," as she "yelled [and]
pleaded with him" that "it was hurting."6 Though the pornographic literature in question was ultimately found in the basement, Justice Clark focused his resuscitation of facts on the bedroom, noting how police searched "a dresser, a chest of drawers, a
closet and some suitcases," even perusing "a photo album" belonging to the defendant.o
According to criminal law scholar Jeannie Suk, judicial articulations of privacy in gendered terms-as attacks on the privacy of
women-reflected a larger "anxiety" suffered by men "about intrusion" into male dominated private space." This anxiety, argues
Suk, stemmed in part from the traditional "nineteenth-century
bourgeois ideal" of the home as a man's castle-a place where a

66. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672-73 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); David Alan
Sklansky, A Postscripton Katz and Stonewall: Evidence from Justice Stewart's First Draft,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1492 (2012); Sklansky, supranote 16, at 877. For a discussion
of Mapp's failure to raise the exclusionary rule, see LONG, supranote 31, at 73.
67.

Sklansky, supra note 16, at 878, 906.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644-45.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 645.
Suk, supra note 16, at 491.
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man's property, including his spouse, was protected from other
men." This anxiety also stemmed from a concern that men be
"free from government intrusion" in sexual matters, including the
right to "look at images of sex and naked women," a right the
Court actually came to recognize in Stanley v. Georgia in 1969.73
Though Mapp predated Stanley by eight years, the gendered tone
of Justice Clark's opinion, coupled with the pornography laden
facts at issue in Mapp, suggest that preserving porn may in fact
have been one of the inspirations for suddenly invoking the exclusionary rule, making it an early defense to sexual "thought control.""
Another, more commonly cited inspiration for the Mapp ruling
was race, a point made by criminal procedure scholars like Tracey
Meares and Thomas Davies.7 ' According to Davies, the "racist police abuse" in Mapp together with a prior decision styled Monroe
v. Pape, "may have convinced Justice Clark that it was past time
to extend federal supervision to state criminal justice." Yet, the
precise manner in which Mapp aided racial minorities is not
clear." In fact, as the next section will show, initial signs that police procedure improved in the wake of Mapp quickly gave way to
reports that the decision was pushing police to new levels of corruption in New York City, both in terms of how they procured evidence and how they treated minorities on the street. If Mapp's
genius was its ability to mask sexual prurience in the theatre of

72.

AT HOME IN THE LAW, supra note 19, at 3.

73. Suk, supra note 16, at 489 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 558-59
(1969)).
74. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 569. Of course, no Justice claimed to be interested in possessing porn. Instead, Warren, Brennan, and Clark all confessed to a sudden conversion,
prompted in part by a string of cases involving police entry into private homes, but also by
Justice Stewart's suggestion, made during an impromptu discussion in an elevator, that
the Fourth Amendment be invoked. See LONG, supra note 31, at 83-84. While Stewart's
success can certainly be attributed to the arrival of Warren, Brennan, and Clark-none of
whom had been present in Wolf v. Colorado in 1949-the Cold War context may also have
encouraged the majority to fight the paranoid excesses of anti-communism-including its
obsession with rooting out sexual deviants-through a more robust enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
75. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away: The Century of FourthAmendment "Search and Seizure" Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 933, 983 (2010); Meares, supra note 4, at 106 (describing the Warren
Court's criminal procedure cases as "a branch of 'race law').
76. Davies, supra note 75, at 983; see also Meares, supra note 4, at 106.
77. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1288.
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domestic privacy, then its downfall would be what Devon Carbado
calls the "racial theater" of the street."
II. "SUBSTANCE NOT SHADOW"
Decided on June 19, 1961, Mapp appeared to have an immediately positive impact on police. 9 According to Richard Kuh, Secretary of the New York State District Attorney's Association, police
did in fact become more serious about acquiring warrants before
conducting searches of private homes following the ruling.o Prior
to Mapp, claimed Kuh, officers rarely requested a warrant before
searching an individual's private "apartment, home, flat, [or]
loft."" "All this has changed," he argued in September of 1962,
one year after the opinion was handed down; tendencies towards
ignoring warrant requirements "changed overnight."8 2
Yet, Mapp triggered unanticipated effects as well. Over a
twelve month period, for example, arrests for illegal lottery or
"policy" violations dropped thirty-five percent in New York City.
During that same time period, convictions for "narcotics misdemeanorJ" offenses dropped nearly forty percent." Similar drops
could be found for contraband-"possession of weapons and for
possession of obscene photographs."" Such declines stemmed
from the fact that officers felt uncertain as to whether they could
lawfully search suspects who were not officially under arrest. 6
Even as arrests dropped, a more troubling phenomenon also
emerged: police corruption appeared to increase. According to
Kuh, during the year immediately following Mapp, police testimony became increasingly "improbable" as officers began to testify that upon seeing police, suspects simply "removed" objects from

78. Carbado, supranote 8, at 953.
79. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
80. Richard H. Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year After: An Appraisal of Its Impact in
New York, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 1962, at 1.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Policy Prosecutions Here Cut by Curb on Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 1962, at 1.
84. Kuh, supra note 80, at 2 (noting a thirty-eight percent decrease); see also Leonard
E. Ryan, Narcotics Case ConvictionsDrop Since Ban on Illegal Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1962, at 35.
85. Ryan, supranote 84, at 35; see also Kuh, supra note 80, at 2.
86. Ryan, supra note 84, at 35.

2014)

TO CORRAL AND CONTROL

1237

their pockets, "threw" them to the ground, and obviated the need
for a search." Similarly, police assigned to search private homes
began to testify more frequently that they had been "invited" to
search the homes of defendants, again precluding the need for a
warrant." Not only did Mapp reduce arrests, but it also encouraged police to stretch the truth, telling more elaborate "stories" to
bolster the arrests they did make.89
In a study of almost 4000 arrests, New York Legal Services
corroborated Kuh's suspicions, providing hard data that police arrest narratives changed significantly in the aftermath of the ruling."o For example, claims that suspects mysteriously "dropped"
contraband upon sight of police rose significantly after the decision, particularly among uniformed officers who reported a 79.6%
spike in such "dropsies" during the year immediately following
Mapp.' Meanwhile, reports that police found contraband "hidden
on the person" of suspects declined significantly at precisely the
same time, indicating that police were suddenly cautious about
admitting to searches.92
An officer provided a clue into the brave new world of evidence
recovery post-Mapp during an illegal search trial in New York
City on September 12, 1962." Charged with unlawfully searching
a suspect, the officer claimed that he "frisked" suspects but did
not conduct actual searches of them." Pressed by a judge, the officer then demonstrated a standard frisk before the court, a rela-

87. Kuh, supra note 80, at 1 n.2; see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL: LAw ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 214-15 (2d. ed. 1975) (arguing that

police not only reported dropped evidence but "reconstruct[ed] a set of complex happenings
in such a way that, subsequent to the arrest, probable cause can be found according to appellate court standards"); Barlow, supra note 11, at 549-50; Joseph S. Oteri & Charlotte
A. Perretta, "Dropsy" Evidence and the Viability of the Exclusionary Rule, 1 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 35, 41 (1971-1972); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-andSeizure Practicesin Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 95 (1968).

88. Ryan, supra note 84, at 35.
89. Kuh, supra note 80, at 1 n.2.
90.

Barlow, supra note 11, at 550, 553, 556.

91. Id. at 556. Another tactic employed to achieve dropped evidence was documented
by criminal law scholar Dallin Oaks in 1970, who reported that "a police officer without a
warrant may rush a suspect, hoping to produce a panic in which the person will visibly
discard the narcotics and give the officer cause to arrest him." Dallin H. Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 699 n.90 (1970).
92. Legal Services distinguished uniformed officers from plainclothes officers and
members of New York's specialized Narcotic Bureau. Barlow, supra note 11, at 553.
93. Jack Roth, Is 'Frisk' Illegal? Judge to Decide,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1962, at 54.
94. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

1238

[Vol. 48:1223

tively violent maneuver that aimed to shake evidence to the
ground." Rather than simply pat down the outside of the suspect's clothing, for example, the patrolman "grabbed" the suspect
"and practically lifted him off his feet," meanwhile shaking him to
loosen any items that might be secreted in his pockets, waistband, or belt." As a cigarette lighter and pair of eyeglasses "fell"
to the floor, the manner in which a frisk might generate a drop
suddenly became apparent, leaving open the question of whether
Mapp's prohibition on searches also applied to frisks, even forceful ones like the one demonstrated by the officer."
Even if officers decided against frisks, other means of procuring
evidence from suspects on the street emerged post-Mapp." In
New York, for example, patrolmen "rush[ed]" suspects, "hoping to
produce a panic" that would then lead them to "visibly discard"
evidence." Here too, the Court's application of the exclusionary
rule had a counterintuitive effect: increasing the likelihood that
police would engage in menacing behavior to get suspects to drop
evidence.0
Police efforts to induce dropped evidence indicate that rather
than improve police conduct, Mapp may have only intensified the
use of force, lying, and deception, pressing police to misrepresent
precisely how they acquired evidence.'o' Of course, most dropsy
cases did not involve the search of private homes, hence Mapp's
success at garnering greater warrant requests. However, even
Mapp's warrant data raised questions about the decision's ultimate effects. For example, New York Legal Services concluded
that although police requested more warrants to search private
rooms following Mapp, the actual location of arrests generally

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Oaks, supranote 91, at 699 n.90.
Id.
Id.

101. Evidence of Mapp's detrimental effect was substantiated by a presidential commission appointed by Lyndon Johnson to investigate urban unrest in the 1960s, which
found that "field interrogations are a major source of friction between the police and minority groups." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]; see also Adina

Schwartz, "Just Take Away Their Guns'" The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 326 (1995). For a discussion of the difficulty of ascertaining the
exclusionary rule's full effect, see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (1999).

TO CORRAL AND CONTROL

2014]

1239

seemed to migrate out of private rooms and into public spaces following the decision. To illustrate, the location of most arrests prior to Mapp were streets (35%) and "unexplained rooms" (26%),
meaning "rooms entered without explanation by the police."102
Following the ruling, police reported lower numbers of arrests in
unexplained rooms, dropping them from 26% to 12%, meanwhile
increasing arrests in "halls," "roof landings," and "basements.""o'
What did this mean? Just as Mapp may have pressured officers
to acquire warrants before entering homes, so too may the decision have refocused police attention on public space. 0 4 Rather
than improve police professionalism, the decision simply transported police corruption, removing it from private homes to public
areas (streets, halls, roof landings, and basements), where police
could then shake down suspects for evidence.'0 5 This seemed a
reasonable conclusion to New York Legal Services, who surmised
that officers may have "stopped entering private rooms" and
turned instead to spending "more time in the streets and halls."'
Rather than "level the playing field" between rich and poor, Mapp
simply provided more privacy to the already well-off, particularly
those wealthy enough to live behind closed doors-either in spacious suburban homes or door-manned buildings-where police
were unlikely to prowl."o Conversely, poor residents of cramped
apartments and public housing projects-the very people most in
need of public space-suddenly found themselves the targets of
intensified police searches, albeit in their halls, landings, and
basements.'

102.

Barlow, supranote 11, at 570.

103.

Id.

104. That Mapp may have encouraged police to focus on public space provides an ironic
backdrop to the argument made by criminal law scholar Tracey Meares that law enforcement should be "re-engineered" so that its "negative consequences [are] not visited upon
weakly organized communities." Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
669, 696 (1998); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 474 (2000)
("[Ploor, minority, inner-city communities generally conform to a place-based social organization model of crime.")
105. Barlow, supranote 11, at 570.
106. Id. at 558.
107. For the playing field analogy, see Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1288. For the argument that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence discriminates against the poor, see Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the FourthAmendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 40102 (2003).
108. Here, data from New York sharpens the point made by I. Bennett Capers that police procedure is tied closely to the racialization of space. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Polic-
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To what extent, if any, did the Supreme Court anticipate such
an outcome? Rather than predict police corruption, the Court
seemed convinced that Mapp would diminish it. "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker," lectured the majority opinion, "it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."'o Rather than breed anarchy, the
Court seemed to think it was restoring public confidence by reforming police behavior. "Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws," the Court concluded, implying that Mapp would ultimately pressure law enforcement to heightened, not lowered, lawfulness."o
Not everyone agreed. Only a few months after Mapp was handed down, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission declared that better
methods of improving police conduct existed than "those which
provide sanctions after the fact," like the exclusionary rule."' To
the Commission's mind, "preventive" measures promised to be
more effective at regulating police misconduct, including
measures aimed at "[tihe application of professional standards to
the selection and training of policemen."" 2 The report asserted
that such standards worked for "Federal police agents," and could
be further augmented by "good pay, high recruit selection standards, and training in scientific crime detection, in human relations, and in police administration.""' To encourage such reforms,
the Commission recommended federal "grants-in-aid" to state and
local governments, enabling them to develop "selection tests and
standards," "training programs in constitutional rights and human relations," and "college-level schools of police administration.""

ing, Race, and Place, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 46 (2009). Mapp's impact on police
strategy in New York City calls into question the extent to which race animated the opinion. Either the Court did not anticipate the opinion's negative impact on urban minorities,
or they never intended for the ruling to help African Americans, a contested point. For example, Capers argues that race animated the opinion. Capers, supra note 4, at 7.
109. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
110. Id.

111. Excerpts from Civil Rights Unit's Report and Statement by Hesburgh, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1961, at 22.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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While the Civil Rights Commission advocated improvements in
police training, state and local courts struggled with the challenge of how, precisely, to interpret Mapp. "I cannot here even
begin to develop all of the conflicting opinions that have been
rendered by a variety of trial judges," lamented District Attorney
Richard Kuh one year after the decision."' To take just a few examples, the Bronx County trial court or "Supreme Court" as it
was called in New York, held in People v. Salerno that officers
had probable cause to frisk a suspicious individual on the street
based on the time of night he was sighted, the manner in which
he was dressed, and the fact that he appeared to be carrying a
weapon."' Meanwhile, the New York County Supreme Court held

the opposite in People v. Rivera, a case where police stopped and
"patted the outside" clothing of a suspect detected at 1:30 A.M.
peering into the window of a bar and grill in a high-crime neighborhood of Manhattan."' According to the court, police officers
were authorized to stop but not frisk such suspects prior to arrest."'
Not long thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals outraged
police when it overturned a policy conviction in which officers had
made repeated sightings of individuals handing money to a suspect on the street, searched the suspect, and found a list of numbers and cash."' Though considered a classic policy collector situation, Romie Moore's arrest struck the state's highest appellate
court as unlawful, particularly since "mere evidence of persons
handing money to another person does not prove a crime.""o Not
only did police find such an observation absurd, but the court
failed to answer the question whether an officer could search a

115. Kuh, supranote 80, at 2.
116. People v. Salerno, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
117. People v. Rivera, 238 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
118. Id. at 624. Two years later, the New York Court of Appeals reversed Rivera, holding that police were authorized to stop and frisk suspicious persons. See People v. Rivera,
201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964). To the court's mind, the "frisking" represented "no more
than a proper balance between the constitutional rights of the officers and the public to
their lives and the constitutional right of the defendant to his privacy." People v. Salerno,
235 N.Y.S. 2d 879, 887 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); see also John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York's "Stop and Frisk"Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 211, 229 (1964).
119. Kuh, supra note 80, at 2 (citing People v. Moore, 183 N.E.2d 225, 225-26 (N.Y.
1962)).
120. Moore, 183 N.E.2d at 226.
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defendant even if he did not have "conclusive proof' that a crime
was being committed.12 '
By March of 1962, Governor Nelson Rockefeller joined police in
declaring that "confusion" had become Mapp's primary contribution to the law of search and arrest.122 To aid patrolmen on the
street, Rockefeller endorsed a wave of measures aimed at improving working conditions, training, and pay for police, many of
which echoed the Civil Rights Commission's recommendations of
1961.123 To take just a few examples, the Governor endorsed additional appropriations for state police so that they would not have
to work more than forty hours a week.'2 ' Rockefeller also announced a fifty percent increase in the number of required training hours for police, going from eighty to one hundred twenty,
and recommended uniform standards of "age, education, and
physical and character qualifications" for all new recruits.125 For
older police officers "who [had] never received formal training," he
endorsed the creation of courses that paralleled the "mandatory
basic course" required of entry-level police.126
Despite Rockefeller's best hopes, police found calls for increased training to be on par with measures like the exclusionary
rule-superficial checks that ignored the root causes of inequality. According to New York Police Commissioner Vincent Broderick, large percentages of New York's "Negro and Spanishspeaking" populations were "being discriminated against in housing and forced to live in ghetto areas."12' Addressing such structural issues, argued Broderick, was more important than correcting superficial matters of training or procedure.128 To his mind,
the "devastating" poverty of the ghetto, including poor "educa121. Kuh, supranote 80, at 2.
122. Governor Nelson D. Rockefeller, Law Enforcement Message (Mar. 23, 1962), in
NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 295, 297 (1962) [hereinafter Rockefeller, Law Enforcement Message].
123. See id. at 301; Governor Nelson D. Rockefeller, Annual Message (Jan. 9, 1963), in
NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 410, 431-32 (1963) [hereinafter Rockefeller, 1963
Annual Message].
124. Rockefeller, Law Enforcement Message, supra note 122, at 301.
125. Rockefeller, 1963 Annual Message, supra note 123, at 431; Governor Nelson D.
Rockefeller, Annual Message (Jan. 8, 1964), in NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL
461, 468 (1964) [hereinafter Rockefeller, 1964 Annual Message].
126. Rockefeller, 1964 Annual Message, supra note 125, at 469.
127. Letter from Vincent L. Broderick, N.Y. Police Comm'r, to John V. Lindsay, Mayor
of N.Y. 7 (Feb. 8, 1966) (on file with New York Municipal Archives).
128. Id. at 8.
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tion," "housing," and "employment," were "the pressing issue[s] of
[that] time."" "Is it not time," declared Broderick on February 8,
1966, "for us to stand up and say that we intend to deal with substance and not with shadow?""o Only the "marshalling of all of
the resources of the State and Federal Governments," continued
Broderick, could "help these, our fellow citizens."'
In the absence of structural reform, police pushed for more limited gains, including a statute authorizing officers "to search and
question a person" suspected of committing a crime "without
making an arrest."13 2 An early reference to stop and frisks, the
measure gained endorsements from the Combined Council of Law
Enforcement Officials, a body made up of the State District Attorneys Association, the State Sheriffs' Association, the Municipal
Police Training Council and the State Association of Chiefs of Police.' All four agencies hoped to carve out exceptions to Mapp via
state legislation, a point they made clear in a pamphlet entitled
Let your Police-Police!arguing that Mapp had "rendered good
police work meaningless and police experience as worthless."' To
illustrate, the pamphlet cited the facts in People v. Cassone, a
case involving a police officer who noticed two men "lugging a
heavy object into the trunk" of a car, only to find that it was a
Western Union safe."' Unbelievably, the trial court held that the
arrest was unlawful "because it was based 'on mere suspicion,"'
not probable cause.'
To remedy such problems, the NYPD joined the Combined
Council and endorsed four bills that would correct certain inequities in the law of criminal procedure.' Two of the four bills authorized officers to arrest suspects in cases where they had "reasonable grounds" or "reasonable cause" for believing that a crime

129. Id. at 7-8.
130. Id. at 8.
131. Id.
132. John Sibley, Governor to Offer Legislature a Program to Prevent Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1964, at 23.
133. Memoranda of Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, in NEW YORK
STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 68 (1964) [hereinafter Memoranda].
134. COMBINED COUNCIL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, LET YOUR POLICEPOLICE! 1-2 (1963).
135. Id. at 4 (citing People v. Cassone, 230 N.Y.S.2d 822, 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)).
136. Id. (citing Cassone, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 825).
137. Id. at 6.
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either was being committed or had just been completed."' The
third facilitated "the execution of [search] warrants" where property risked being destroyed, and the fourth authorized police "to
stop, temporarily detain, question and search a person for weapons where there [was] reasonable ground to suspect a crime.
That the NYPD would push for a state law authorizing officers
to stop and frisk suspects who appeared armed was not, .on its
face, a revolutionary move. The genesis of formalizing stop and
frisks had emerged as early as 1939, when the Interstate Commission on Crime appointed a committee to draft a model code
governing the law of arrest.'40 Prior to that point, a disorganized
blend of common law and statute governed how police could handle suspicious persons on the street.'4 ' Often, this left officers confused about whether stops were technically arrests or not, leading
some to avoid questioning suspicious individuals for fear of "a suit
for false arrest." 4 ' At other times, police extended stops to the
point that they became unregulated detentions, or "imprisonment
ex communicado," a phenomenon that the Uniform Arrest Act
sought to contain by placing a two-hour limitation on the time
that police could detain someone.
In addition to regulating stops, the Uniform Arrest Act also
governed frisks, or searches, authorizing officers to search suspects if they had a reasonable fear that they were dangerous.'4 4
By holding that a law enforcement officer could search someone
whenever he had "reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger," the Uniform Arrest Act settled one of the many questions
raised by Mapp, namely whether officers could stop and search
suspects without a warrant, and without having to lie and say
that the suspect had dropped contraband.' Rather than encour138.

Id.

139. Id.
140. Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 316 (1942). The
committee completed its recommendations in 1942. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 86-89 (rev. ed. 1949); see also Wayne R.

LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 40, 43 (1968).
141. See CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
at 316.

142.

§ 21(a)

cmt. A (1930); Warner, supra note 140,

Warner, supranote 140, at 320.

143. Id. at 322.
144. Id. at 324-25.
145. See id. at 325 (quoting 48 Del. Laws ch. 304,
marks omitted).

§

51 (1951)) (internal quotation
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age corruption, the Act sought to reinforce "respect" for the law
among police, meanwhile reducing the odds that suspects might
feel "unjustly treated," and less willing to "cooperate." 46
To its backers, the "stop and frisk" law reinforced the emerging
image of the police officer as a professional and an "expert," the
very kind of individual that Governor Rockefeller sought to produce with higher standards, in-house training programs, and better hours.'4 ' Further, the Combined Council promoted the statute
as a much needed safety measure for police, not just a tool for
better, more effective law enforcement. "Under present law," declared the Council, stopping and frisking a subject would not only
amount to an unlawful arrest, but could even invite suspects to
"use as much force as necessary" to stop the officer in question,
even harming them."' Convinced that a stop and frisk law would
improve police work conditions, the Combined Council also argued that it benefited those who were searched."'4 Recognizing
that police might arrest individuals who they would otherwise only stop and frisk, the Council noted that "[w]henever an innocent
person is arrested, charged with a crime, and brought before a
magistrate, his reputation is harmed, he is humiliated, greatly
inconvenienced and put to considerable expense."9 0 Better that
suspects simply get patted down on the sidewalk and set free.
Not everyone agreed. Black assemblymen objected to the stop
and frisk legislation, arguing "that it would help create 'a police
state' by subjecting the people of their districts to 'even greater
abuse than they now suffer at the hands of police.""'.. At the time,
the "highest concentration" of arrests in New York occurred in
predominantly black neighborhoods, most notably Harlem.'
Aware of such geographic concerns, black politicians argued that
New York's stop and frisk law would "allow policemen to 'push
around' citizens and permit them to operate as 'the Gestapo,"'
precisely the type of totalitarianism that the Court had tried to

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Memoranda, supra note 133, at 64.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 66-67.

150. Id. at 67.
151.
at 41.
152.

Layhmond Robinson, Assembly Votes Anticrime Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1964,
Barlow, supra note 11, at 579.
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address in Mapp.'" Yet, the terrain had shifted. While Mapp created a zone of freedom within the home, it intensified police surveillance of the street, a move perfected by the normalization of
stop and frisks.' 4 As the next section demonstrates, support for
stop and frisk only intensified as urban unrest grew, creating a
stark disconnect between national narratives of expanding rights
for criminal defendants and state sponsored policies of ghetto
control.
III. "To CORRAL AND CONTROL THE GHETTO"
Black complaints about New York's stop and frisk law underscored the complexity of police/minority relations in the city, a relationship that would only become more strained as the 1960s
progressed. For example, in June 1963 racial unrest exploded
when over one thousand African Americans gathered to protest
the arrest of a "Negro vendor of ices" in Harlem as officers
"swinging nightsticks" quelled the crowd.' According to James
Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality
("CORE") such violence threatened to "boil up 'in Harlems
throughout the country' as black frustration over increased joblessness and "slum conditions" threatened "racial turmoil."'" To
avoid such turmoil, borough legislators met "to enact stronger
laws curtailing job discrimination against Negroes and other minorities," prompting city leaders to acknowledge the challenge
that structural inequalities posed to black life.'" Yet, even as New
York officials discoursed about long term goals like employment,
housing, and education, so too did they recognize the short term
necessity of keeping things calm. According to New York City
Mayor Robert F. Wagner, "[c]onstructive changes [were] taking
place in both the North and the South," but this did not change

153. Robinson, supra note 151, at 41.
154. See id.
155.

THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR

CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH 304 (2008); Harlem 'Normal'After Outbreak: Extra Policemen
on Street-27Are Arraigned, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1963, at 20.

156. Negro Leader Says Unrest May Cause Violence in Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1963, at 14.

157.

Special Session on Rights Asked: 22 Democrats Seek Action on Job Discrimination,

N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 22.
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the fact that police bore a particularly "difficult and delicate responsibility" to preserve "peace and order."'"
Precisely the kind of threat to order that Wagner alluded to
emerged in New York on July 9, 1963, when civil rights activists
initiated a sit-in on the steps of Manhattan's City Hall.159 Initially, Wagner allowed the demonstrators to "conduct their sit-in
without hindrance," declaring that he had "deep sympathy" for
their effort to "focus public attention on the basic problem of civil
rights."' However, the demonstrators quickly began to engage in
activity that Wagner later characterized as "outright provocation," including "outbursts of shouting, chanting, and littering"
that created "an unjustifiable interference with the orderly operations of Government at its very seat and center.""' On August 22,
violence between the demonstrators and police erupted, resulting
in the injury of three officers.162 Outraged, Mayor Wagner ordered
the "immediate removal" of the protestors."' To his mind, the
fight to maintain order in the face of what was quickly becoming
a "social revolution" taxed police in ways that the fight against
"crime and evil" did not."' Suddenly, law enforcement had to be
versed not simply in "police tactics," but also in "civil rights," precisely so that they could better communicate with potential demonstrators, hopefully diffusing demonstrations without sparking violence.' From this came a need for a "well-educated and
professionally trained" force, made up of what Wagner referred to
as "professional soldiers."'6 6
That Wagner wished for professional police/soldiers versed in
rights rhetoric underscored the manner in which police professionalism related to the successful management of political
demonstrations and minority communities in New York. If police
were better educated and better trained, Wagner implied, then
they might be less prone to aggravating urban crowds, and less
158. Robert F. Wagner, Mayor of N.Y., Remarks at Swearing in of 600 Policemen at
City Hall Plaza (June 26, 1963) (transcript on file with New York Municipal Archives).
159. Press Release, Robert F. Wagner, Mayor of N.Y. (Aug. 22, 1963) (on file with New
York Municipal Archives).
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Wagner, supra note 158, at 2, 7.
165. See id. at 3-4.
166. Id. at 3, 7.
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likely to incite riots-whether structural factors changed or not.
Dramatic evidence of the link between police and riots emerged in
the summer of 1964, when violence broke out in New York after a
white police officer shot a fifteen-year-old black male in Harlem.'
During a demonstration protesting the boy's death, "[t]housands"
of African Americans "raced through the center of Harlem, attacking white persons, pulling fire alarms and looting stores.""
Violence continued for three days, eventually spreading to the
Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn where a "full-scale
riot" exploded after CORE "staged another rally to protest the
shooting of the Negro youth.""o
In an editorial commenting on the violence, black writer James
Baldwin confirmed the relationship between police procedure and
ghetto containment. "There is a very good reason for the Negroes
to hate the police in Harlem," declared Baldwin; their "competence" was "abysmal" and "they know no other way of coping with
the forces to which they are exposed" than to engage in "brutality."' 7 Such brutality, continued Baldwin, formed a critical part of
their efforts "to corral and control the citizens of the ghetto."7
Baldwin's accusation that the NYPD sought primarily to "corral"
the ghetto coincided eerily with the police's own complaints that
judicial insistence on procedural reform simply obscured the unfair burden placed on police to maintain urban harmony, meanwhile ignoring the need for substantive political and economic
change."7 Here, a prominent black voice corroborated police complaints, underscoring procedure's role in preventing urban unrest.
That urban unrest threatened the nation became apparent to
many during the early months of 1964 as metropolitan areas
across the United States erupted in violence."' In Jackson, Mis167. Though the pressures of joblessness and "slum conditions" provided the root causes of such riots, Wagner realized that it was all too often police action that triggered them.
SUGRUE, supra note 155, at 327.
168. Background of Northern Negro Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1964, at 81.

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Baldwin, supranote 22, at 3.
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.

174. See, e.g., Peggy Robinson, First Race Riot of 1964: 2 Chicago Schools Tangle, CHI.
DEFENDER, Jan. 25, 1964, at 1; Negroes Riot over KKK; 30 Jailed, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19,

1964, at 20 [hereinafter Negroes Riot over KKK]; Police in Jackson Break Up Protest: Use
Tear Gas and Shots to Quell Negro Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1964, at 22 [hereinafter
Police in Jackson].

2014]

TO CORRAL AND CONTROL

1249

sissippi, for example, "hundreds of [black] students threw rocks,
bricks and bottles," at "helmeted officers" after a white man
struck a black coed with his automobile in February."' Meanwhile in Chicago, "[a]ngry Negroes set fire" to a convenience store
and proceeded to "rampage" for two nights after a white shopkeeper accused a black woman of "stealing a bottle of gin."176 In
Atlanta, upwards of 300 black protestors engaged in a "brawling
sidewalk demonstration" against "[t]en robed Ku Klux Klansmen"
who had entered a downtown Krystal's restaurant.'7 7 Among the
demonstrators was John Lewis, chairman of the Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee, who allegedly "kicked and elbowed officers" as they placed him under arrest.'7
The worst rioting stemmed directly from police action. Not only
did violence explode in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant after police shot a black teenager in July 1964, but rioting began north of
the city in Rochester after "white police moved into a Negro
neighborhood" to arrest a man "who had been creating a disturbance at a dance" that same month."'7 Not long thereafter, rioting
exploded for three consecutive nights in Paterson, New Jersey after police arrested "a Negro woman on a disorderly conduct
charge."' Ninety miles south, in Philadelphia, the arrest of "a
Negro woman whose car was blocking an intersection" led to
"[d]isorders" that lasted three nights in August as "[r]ioters broke
store windows, looted shops [and] hurled bricks from roofs at police."'
The alarming spike in black violence caught the attention not
only of average Americans, but of international audiences. Soviet
newspapers like Isvestiia and Pravda boasted headline coverage
of American race riots, charging America of being a land of racial
discrimination and political tyranny.'82 Similarly, "leaders of African nations denounced the United States" for its perceived treat175.

Police in Jackson, supranote 174, at 22.

176. Background of Northern Negro Riots, supranote 168, at 81.
177. Negroes Riot over K.K.K., supranote 174, at 20.
178. Id. (underscoring the explosive nature of this particular protest, the Klansmen
"remained inside the restaurant because they didn't feel safe leaving while the Negroes
were outside").

179. Background of Northern Negro Riots, supranote 168, at 81.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. ANN K. JOHNSON, URBAN GHETTO RIOTS, 1965-1968: A COMPARISON OF SOVIET
AND AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE 94-95 (1996).
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ment of racial minorities, transforming America's ghetto riots into a Cold War liability warranting quick and effective state control.183
Public embarrassment over riots spurred government officials
across the country, including police, prosecutors, and judges to
find ways of quelling the urban disorder.18 4 In Philadelphia, for
example, officials deliberately curtailed a local tradition, the annual Mummer's Parade, to minimize rioting."' Traditionally held
on New Year's Day, the parade featured upwards of "15,000
mummers" belonging to thirty-one different marching clubs, including "22 string band units, four fancy groups in satin-covered
floats and huge capes, and five brigades of comics.""' The comics,
in a manner that would prove explosive in 1964, often performed
"in 'blackface,"' a practice that roused white concern when city officials learned of "an active recruiting program being conducted in
Harlem for persons to come here and protest.""' Local CORE
chairman Louis Smith warned that police should "look out for the
rooftops because that is the way the people of New York operate,"
implying that outside demonstrators would come to Philadelphia
from New York and hurl missiles down onto paraders.'" Philadelphia's "400 Negro ministers" concurred, warning that "rioting
along the route of the parade" was likely to occur.
To prevent violence, local ministers filed suit in city court, arguing for an injunction banning anyone in blackface from participating in the march.' During hearings before a three-judge panel, police officials warned that "there might be 'physical violence'
unless blackface marchers were barred [from] the parade."'
Though attorneys for the parade countered that "blackface ...

183. See RICHARD LENTZ & KARLA K. GOWER, THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND: RACIAL
ISSUES, PRESS, AND PROPAGANDA IN THE COLD WAR 1, 162 (2010).

184.

See generally Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights, and Civil Disso-

nance, 77 YALE L.J. 1520, 1533-34 (1968) (outlining in Part II the Supreme Court's response to urban unrest which evolved from particularly narrow holdings that appeased
protestors to a more authoritarian law and order approach as violence increased).

185. William G. Weart, Blackface Is Barred in Mummers Parade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
1964, at 1.
186. Id. at 19.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.; 3 Judges Ban Blackface Make-Up for Mummers, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1964, at 1.
Weart, supranote 185, at 19.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1, 19.
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was 'traditional' and [that] the marchers had no intention of belittling Negroes," the three judges presiding over the case decided
that a real threat of violence existed, warranting an end to the
city's blackface tradition.1 92
As Philadelphia judges regulated Mummers, New York police
focused on radical black leaders, among them William Epton, an
activist arrested for conspiracy to riot and criminal anarchy in
August 1964.' Epton's conviction stemmed from the 1964 riots in
Harlem, during which Epton publicly called for "organized resistance to the police and the destruction of the State."194 Epton
objected to his conviction, arguing that while he had been an outspoken critic of the United States' "paramilitary police force," his
primary concerns were structural, focused on the "inhumane conditions" of ghetto life, including the persistence of high "infant
mortality rate [s]," "tuberculosis," and "unemployment.""
New York authorities showed little sympathy, positing that the
black radical not only voiced interest in encouraging riots, but
presented a clear and present danger to the state-a critical element in the charge of criminal anarchy.' Not invoked since the
prosecution of Communist Benjamin Gitlow in 1920, criminal anarchy seemed a poor fit for Epton, who at best appeared to represent a radical fringe of city politics.197 Yet, the very fact that Epton became the subject of criminal prosecution underscored at
least two interconnected phenomena relating to criminal procedure and radical politics in New York at the time.
First, Epton's conviction for criminal anarchy not only invoked
memories of the persecution of communists like Benjamin Gitlow
in the 1920s, but pointed to persistent concerns with the kind of
structural change that communists continued to endorse into the
1960s. Like Gitlow, for example, Epton also identified with the

192. Id.
193. Frank Donner, The Epton Case: Southern Justice in New York, 24 GUILD PRAC. 1,
1 (1965).
194. People v. Epton, 227 N.E.2d 829, 835 (N.Y. 1967).
195. William Epton, We Accuse: Bill Epton Speaks to the Court (Jan. 27, 1966), available at http://www.mltranslations.org/us/epton.htm.
196. Epton, 227 N.E.2d at 835; Jack Roth, CriminalAnarchy Charged to Epton in Indictment Here, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1964, at 1.
197. Gitlow Convicted in Anarchy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1920, at 17; Gitlow's Defense Is a 'Red' Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1920, at 3; see Peter Kihss, Plot Is Laid to Harlem Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1965, at 79.
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communist cause, serving as the "vice chairman" of Harlem's
Progressive Labor Movement, a Maoist organization boasting
upwards of 1200 members.'" Though not a union leader, Epton's
concern with structural inequality paralleled police concerns with
structural inequality, underscoring the fact that both police and
advocates for the poor viewed procedural reforms simply as superficial salves to much deeper, structural wounds.
Not only did Epton's identification with radical labor point to
police/poor parallels, but Epton's conviction itself suggested a
contested relationship between the Supreme Court's criminal
procedure rulings and civil rights. When Mapp v. Ohio was decided in 1961, for example, many assumed that the Court's criminal
procedure rulings stemmed from an interest in civil rights, an interest articulated in rulings like Brown v. Board of Education in
1954 and Cooper v. Aaron attacking massive resistance to civil
rights in 1958.'9' Yet, the Court's zeal for such cases cooled in
1964 even as it blazed ahead with its regulation of police, indicating a disconnect between heightened social control and national
narratives of expanding freedoms.20 0
To illustrate, the Court's early interest in protesters' rights
culminated in a series of rulings overturning the convictions of
black demonstrators from 1961 to 1964.201 One such demonstrator, Janette Hoston, entered a Kress Department store in Baton
Rouge on March 29, 1960, and proceeded to sit at a lunch counter
reserved for whites.20 2 When Hoston refused a request to leave, local police arrested her for disturbing the peace.2" Though a relatively minor criminal charge, Hoston's breach of the peace conviction nevertheless made it to the United States Supreme Court,
who found the case "barren of any evidence that would support a

198. See Kihss, supra note 197, at 79.
199. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-17
(1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954); William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1986); Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and
the FourteenthAmendment: A Dialogue on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (1962).
200. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 492 (1964) (holding damaging statements
inadmissible when defendant was refused his right to counsel).
201. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961); see also Greenberg, supra
note 184, at 1531.
202. Garner,368 U.S. at 159-60.
203. Id. at 160.
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finding that the petitioners' conduct would even 'foreseeably' have
disturbed the public."204 The conclusion was dubious. Sit-in
demonstrations had in fact provoked violence and "fist fights between members of the two races" across the South, as the respondents argued in their brief, 205 but the Court ignored such calamities in a bold statement of support for Hoston's protest.206
The Court continued its support for protest from 1961 to 1964,
deciding upwards of twenty cases in favor of black demonstrators.207 In one of the last such cases decided in 1964, the Court
overturned another breach of the peace conviction, this time in
Columbia, South Carolina. In a case styled Barr v. City of Columbia, the Court reviewed the arrest of "five Negro college students"
for breach of the peace, holding that their sit-in demonstration
had been "polite, quiet, and peaceful," and unlikely "to move onlookers to commit acts of violence."20 ' Though opposing counsel
disagreed, arguing that the demonstration had been "quite
tense," and that "everyone was on pins and needles ... for fear

that it could possibly lead to violence," the Court once again
downplayed any relationship between demonstrations and unrest.209
Barr was the last protest case to hit the Court before the Harlem, Rochester, and Paterson riots that summer. As pitched violence between urban blacks and white police intensified from
June to August, the Court reevaluated its position on civil rights
demonstrations generally, gradually moving against protesters in
a batch of cases originating in the South, two of which involved
protests in a church and one of which involved a demonstration in
a school.210 In all, the Court denied certiorari, leaving the convictions intact without a pronouncement of law.211 Subsequent refusals to grant certiorari followed, coupled with articulations of concern about black demonstrators in cases like Cox v. Louisiana in
204. Id. at 166.
205. See Brief on Behalf of Respondent State of Louisiana at 2, Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961) (Nos. 26, 27, 28); see also Daniel H. Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of FirstSixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 336, 346 (1960).
206. Garner,368 U.S. at 163.
207. Greenberg, supranote 184, at 1529-30.
208. Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 147, 150 (1964).
209. City of Columbia v. Barr, 123 S.E.2d 521, 522 (S.C. 1961).
210. Greenberg, supra note 184, at 1534.
211. See Jones v. Georgia, 379 U.S. 935 (1964); Ford v. Tennessee, 377 U.S. 994 (1964);
Diamond v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 201 (1964); see also Greenberg, supra note 184, at 1534.
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1965. There, the Court held that the exercise of free speech had to
be tempered with the need for "maintaining public order, without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy." 212
One year later, the Court upheld the conviction of thirty-two
black college students who had gathered in protest at the Leon
County jail in Tallahassee, Florida.21 3 Though the students were
charged with malicious trespass, a conviction the Court had overturned in earlier cases like Bouie v. City of Columbia and Hamm
v. City of Rock Hill,214 Justice Black held that the demonstrators
no longer possessed the right to protest "wherever they please,"
maintaining instead that local municipalities-"no less than a
private owner of property"-retained the "power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."2 15 Subsequent anti-protest rulings followed; some clearly
upholding convictions that would, according to civil rights lawyer
Jack Greenberg, "have been reversed" under the Court's early,
enthusiastic civil rights phase. 216 By the close of 1967, the Supreme Court had so tired of civil rights that it even upheld the
conviction of black civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. for
violating an injunction not to march in Birmingham, Alabama
four years earlier, noting that "[t]his Court cannot hold that the
petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures
1 Forgetting that
of the law and carry their battle to the streets.""
the "battle [in] the streets" in Birmingham had in fact been one of
the movement's most significant victories, the Court sided instead
with what King referred to as the "recalcitrant forces in the Deep
South that will use the courts to perpetuate the unjust and illegal
system of racial separation."'

212. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
213. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 40, 48 (1966).
214. Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 307, 317 (1964) (overturning convictions of
black demonstrators for violation of trespass statutes); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347, 348, 363 (1964) (overturning convictions of black demonstrators for violation of a
trespass statute).
215. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47-48 (upholding convictions of black demonstrators for violation of a trespass statute). As Arnold Loewy noted in 1969, "a reasonable would-be demonstrator in the position of Miss Adderley, who read a statute proscribing malicious
trespass, would not be likely to conclude that his conduct would come within the ambit of
the prohibition." Arnold H. Loewy, The Warren Court as Defender of State and Federal
Criminal Laws: A Reply to Those Who Believe That the Court Is Oblivious to the Needs of
Law Enforcement, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1218, 1226 (1969).

216. Greenberg, supranote 184, at 1536.
217. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321, 341 (1967).
218.

GLENN T. ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOcAL AND NATIONAL MOVEMENTS
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As the Court curtailed southern streets, so too did it constrict
urban landscapes in the North. One year after upholding King's
conviction, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction
of William Epton in New York, again for violating an injunction
not to march."' Though Epton was ultimately charged with criminal anarchy, New York's corporation counsel Leo Larkin had also
acquired a "temporary injunction" banning black protest.220 As in
Alabama, such injunctions proved a practical tool for containing
black protest, one of the many "legal means" that New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller invoked "to maintain order in the
state."22 1 Though Epton and King differed in their rhetoric,22 2 King
endorsing non-violence and Epton exhorting blacks to "smash"
the state, both leaders fell victim to the same phenomenon: a
growing consensus on the Court that black protest in public space
needed to be contained.2
One possible explanation for the Court's move against civil
rights demonstrators just as the nation was celebrating civil
rights gains may have been political. While early civil rights
demonstrations in the American South curried national sympathy
for the black plight, later protests in the North and West sent
tendrils of fear through the nation, causing many to fear largescale disorder and unrest. 224 As Supreme Court Justice Hugo
Black put it in 1965, "the crowds that press in the streets for noble goals today can be supplanted tomorrow by street mobs pressuring the courts for precisely opposite ends." 225 Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Burke Marshall agreed, declaring
that while it was one thing to demonstrate against unjust Jim
Crow laws in the South, it was another to take the strategy of civil disobedience and apply it to the "complex and deep-rooted economic and social problems" plaguing minority communities in the

IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE 238 (1997).
219. Epton v. New York, 227 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 29 (1968).
220. Id. at 29 (Stewart, J., concurring); R.W. Apple, Jr., Protest Leaders Seized in Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1964, at 40.
221. Apple, supra note 220, at 1.
222. Apple, supra note 220, at 40; The King Philosophy, THE KING CENTER, http://www.
thekingcenter.org/king-philosophy (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
223. See Greenberg, supranote 184, at 1536; Apple, supra note 220, at 40.
224. See Burke Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 61 VA. L. REV. 785, 801
(1965).
225. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 584 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting in part).
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urban north.22 6 Such an approach, Marshall warned, risked
spreading both disrespect for law and an ensuing "crisis in law

enforcement." 227

Of course, New York police had long claimed that precisely
such a crisis was brewing, only growing more deadly as structural
causes of inequality went unaddressed.2 28 However, the Court
showed less interest in ameliorating structural inequality than it
did in regulating face-to-face interactions on the street, both by
sanctioning the use of injunctions against black demonstrators
and, as urban unrest grew, continuing its campaign to reform police procedure.229 For example, just as the Court began to uphold
the convictions of black demonstrators in the South, so too did it
impose even more stringent requirements on how police handled
criminal suspects in the North, including a requirement that officers alert defendants to their rights prior to questioning.2 M
Though liberals celebrated this move, consecrated in a decision
styled Miranda v. Arizona, few squared it with the Court's antiprotest cases, preferring instead to read the opinion as a victory
for the poor. 23 1 However, the Court's demand that police inform
suspects of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights promised little in the way of structural reform for poverty, sounding instead
like an eerie parallel to calls for a "professional army" well-versed
in rights rhetoric like the one endorsed by New York Mayor Robert Wagner in 1963."' To Wagner, a more rights-savvy police
promised a solution to urban discord, not an end to poverty, a
matter that the Supreme Court did not address directly in its Miranda opinion, though the implications were clear once read beside its protest rulings.2" For example, the Court's decisions in
Adderley, Walker, and Epton all indicate that the nation's highest
tribunal was becoming increasingly interested in corralling black
anger, just as James Baldwin had warned in 1964.

226. Marshall, supranote 224, at 801-02.
227. See id. at 785.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 9, 131-33.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 9, 131-33, 221, 222.
230. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
231. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 13, at 397.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
234. See Epton v. New York, 390 U.S. 29, 29 (1968); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307, 315 (1967); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966).
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Though Miranda provided no guarantee that criminal defendants would actually have their rights upheld, its part in a larger
drama of control was even more subtle, particularly as police departments themselves took cosmetic measures to improve the appearance of police action. For example, the NYPD deliberately
hired a black officer named Lloyd Sealy to head its Harlem pre235
cinct in 1964, a direct response to the riots there that summer.
One month later, New York Police Commissioner Michael J.
Murphy warned his men not to adopt a "rough manner" when interacting with civilians, particularly racial minorities, noting that
harsh manners only bred "hatred and disrespect," amounting to
nothing less than "verbal brutality."2 36 Not long thereafter, the
Department organized a "two-day conclave" attended by chiefs of
police from San Francisco, St. Louis, Boston, and Atlanta-a nod
to a burgeoning NorthlSouth convergence-that aimed to "develop guidelines for police in their daily contacts with the public."m
Among such guidelines was a need for police to "understand the
problems," and the "frustrations . . . of the people living in the

communities they serve."2 " Such attention to sensitivity dovetailed nicely with the Supreme Court's requirement in 1966 that
police respect the dignity of criminal suspects by publicly reading
them their rights.239
Yet, many patrolmen still felt mugged, particularly at decisions
like Mirandathat interfered with their ability to fight crime.24 o To
them, the ruling threatened the critical process of questioning
suspects, a method central to the discovery of evidence. 241' However, police officials like NYPD Commissioner Vincent Broderick
took a broader view, explaining to officers that the police function
had changed and that patrolmen were suddenly required to do
"much more in the community than prevent crime."242 According
to Broderick, they were also required to protect the citizen's right
"to peaceful assembly and protest" meanwhile preserving a "cli-

235. See Harlem Police Leader: Lloyd George Sealy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1964, at 18.
236. Police Cautioned on Rough Manner, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1964, at 27 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
237. On Community Relations, SPRING 3100, Sept. 1965, at 1.
238. Id.

239. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
240.
241.

LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 176-78, 404-06 (1983).
Id. at 404-05.

242.

On Community Relations, supra note 237, at 1.
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mate of law and social order." 243 Just as some had predicted earlier, "crime-prevention" had gradually taken a back seat to "peace-

keeping." 244
Though the new police function rankled some, preserving order
did not always mean infringing on police discretion. To illustrate,
the Supreme Court lifted a significant burden from police in 1968
when it decided Terry v. Ohio, allowing officers to stop and frisk
anyone suspected of actively committing a crime or possessing a
weapon.2 45 In a related case styled Sibron v. New York, the Court
held that New York police officers could rely on the Empire
State's "Stop and Frisk Law" so long as they possessed "reasonable suspicion" that individuals were either "engaged in criminal
activity" or posed "a danger."24 ' Though civil rights groups like the
NAACP argued that the New York law should be invalidated because it promoted "uncontrolled and uncontrollable discretion by
law enforcement officers,"247 the Court disagreed, heralding a major victory for New York police unions. 248 However, the Court did
signal an interest in curbing the excesses generated by Mapp,
particularly its disapproval of police tactics aimed at creating the
illusion of dropped evidence, a move achieved by overturning the
conviction of a suspect who police initially claimed "pulled out a
tinfoil envelope and did attempt to throw same to the ground."24 9
Further, the Court also acknowledged that "frisking" had indeed
become "a severely exacerbating factor in police-community tensions," a point underscoring the link between post-Mapp policing
and urban riots.250
Though lamented by liberals, both Sibron and Terry continued
efforts to normalize the streets in New York, marking the culmination of a much larger campaign to address urban inequality

243. Id.
244. See Burnham, supranote 21, at 35.
245. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Criminal procedure scholar David Harris
shows how judicial interpretation of Terry has significantly expanded police discretion to
stop and frisk suspects. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When

Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 665-66 (1994).
246. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60 (1968).
247. Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, 67), 1967 WL 113672, at *3.
248. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 66.
249. Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
250. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 101, at 18384).
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through strategies of riot-avoidance and containment. As we have
seen, such strategies did not involve structural reforms to ameliorate poverty so much as procedural rules aimed at scripting police/minority conduct. Nor did such strategies impinge on the
larger narrative of expanding rights that came with Mapp v.
Ohio. In fact, one year after the Supreme Court handed down
Terry, it revisited a fact scenario uncannily similar to the one in
Mapp but ruled directly on the obscenity question, allowing individuals to possess obscene materials in their homes, further expanding freedoms germane to domestic space.2 5' Even as urban
minorities complained of heightened police surveillance on the
street, the Court continued to bolster a national narrative of expanding constitutional freedoms, albeit from within the private,
interior confines of the home.
CONCLUSION

Three months before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Terry v. Ohio, a commission appointed by President
Lyndon Johnson to investigate the causes of urban riots in the
United States issued a report, positing that the "abrasive" manner in which police handled ghetto residents posed "a major-and
explosive-source of grievance, tension, and disorder," in the
United States.5 Of particular concern to the "Kerner Commission," as it was called, were the "tension-creating effects" of "stopand-frisk" searches, particularly those conducted at random with
little eye to whether individuals were either armed or dangerous.25 3 Though the report did not mention Mapp v. Ohio, it corroborated the findings of New York Legal Services who had claimed
five years earlier that the Supreme Court's extension of the exclusionary rule to the states had worsened police conduct towards
minorities.254 Terry, ironically, corrected for this, restricting police
to only frisking individuals suspected of being armed or engaged
*
*
*
*
255
in criminal
activity.

251. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559-60, 568 (1969).
252. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1, 8
(1968).

253. Id. at 159-60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. See supra Part II.
255.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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That Terry might have benefited minorities by undoing Mapp's
negative effect on urban policing is generally not recognized by
historians of criminal procedure in the United States.2 56 Instead,
Terry tends to be framed as a turn against the civil rights focus of
Mapp, a coda to the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution. Yet, recovering Terry's role in correcting Mapp is important both for what it says about the exclusionary rule and for
what it says about the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution generally. As this article has shown, the Court framed the
exclusionary rule in Mapp in terms of intimate privacy rather
than racial parity, a point that helps explain why the Court failed
to anticipate its negative, urban effects.2 " Second, as this article
has also sought to demonstrate, both police unions and black activists lamented the Court's move into procedure not as a liberal
effort to help the poor so much as a deliberate attempt to sidestep
the need for more extensive, structural reform.259 Some, like
James Baldwin, even accused the Court of simply trying to "corral
and control" the "ghetto."26 o
Reframing the Court's criminal procedure revolution as an effort to control the ghetto, though at first glance cynical, actually
helps to establish two important points. First, the Supreme
Court's curtailment of police behavior in opinions like Mapp v.
Ohio did not help criminal defendants evenly, proving much more
useful to defendants in private houses than public spaces. 26 1 In
fact, Mapp worsened police/minority conduct in public spaces, so
much so that police themselves began to lobby for formalized stop
and frisk rules. 262 As the Supreme Court reviewed such rules, so
too did it interiorize liberty, thwarting police invasions of the
home meanwhile sanctioning heightened police surveillance of
the street.2 62
While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that
stop and frisks contribute to the incarceration of minorities, she

256. See supra note 13. See generally Cover, supra note 13 (discussing judicial activism
in the protection of minorities without mentioning the effect of Terry v. Ohio).
257. See POWE, supra note 13, at 406-07.
258. See supraPart I.
259. See supraPart II.
260. Baldwin, supra note 22, at 3.
261. See supraPart III.
262. See supraPart III.
263. See supra Part III.
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fails to account for the liberal/geographic forces that contributed
to such a result.2" Like many historians of criminal procedure,
Alexander roots the rise of stop and frisk in a conservative backlash to the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution, a backlash that extended through the War on Drugs.265 While this was
certainly a factor, the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution contributed to incarceration as well, first in the privacy
frame that inspired Mapp v. Ohio, and later in efforts to curb police malfeasance in urban landscapes.26 6 That liberal reform joined
conservative backlash in compartmentalizing liberty remains one
of the least understood, but still important lessons to be learned
from criminal procedure reform in the 1960s, a lesson demonstrating clearly how a narrative of expanding liberty could coincide with mass incarceration.

264.

ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 133.

265. Id. at 5, 59-61.
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